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FERNANDA G. NICOLA*
Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law†
Today, family law is, to a surprising degree, at the center of com-
parative law inquiries committed to legal unification. Comparative
family law projects range from analyzing convergence and harmoni-
zation proposals in the West, to law and development schemes in the
rest of the world. The most salient reforms of abortion, same-sex mar-
riage, transsexual, and adoption rights are increasingly promoted at
the transnational level through international human rights and an-
tidiscrimination principles. Regional and international human rights
tribunals in Europe and Latin America are called upon to interpret
the right to family life, non-discrimination, and freedom of movement
principles to redefine the contours of domestic family, immigration,
and employment law regimes. While comparative lawyers are increas-
ingly involved in shaping these transnational family law regimes,
they present their choices as reflecting objective scientific knowledge
that they have acquired through the comparative law method. This
consensus about a single comparative law method is troubling because
it allows comparison between abstract family law regimes that bear
little relevance to what happens in practice or to the proposal of a
“best” family law regime for unification purposes, while obscuring the
political and economic implications of adopting one particular family
law regime over another.
Since the early 1900s, however, two conflicting methodologies
have characterized the work of Western comparative lawyers address-
ing the family: social-purpose and positive-sociology functionalism.
These Western comparative lawyers separated the individualist and
universal sphere of the market from the altruistic, organic, and tradi-
tional sphere of the family. Because of this market/family dichotomy,
family law was marginalized by those interested in the harmonization
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of the market, while the family remained, by contrast, central to the
work of those interested in legal pluralism.
Today, the reproduction, and subversion, of the family/market
dichotomy has lead toward methodological agreement over social-pur-
pose functionalism for projects committed to unification, convergence,
and harmonization of Western family law. In contrast, and in order to
address some of the pressing questions arising in comparative family
law, I suggest revamping positive-sociology functionalism, especially
for those projects committed to the harmonization of European family
law. By explaining the meaning of family law exceptionalism in com-
parative law, my goal is to make explicit the family/market dichotomy
so that lawyers will openly assess the economic consequences of family
law reforms on the household and the market.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF UNIFICATION TENDENCIES IN
CONTEMPORARY COMPARATIVE FAMILY LAW
Immediately after World War II (WWII), there was no attempt to
openly discuss projects of unification and harmonization of family
law regimes in the West. This attitude changed dramatically. In the
early 1990s, comparative lawyers stopped addressing the family as
exceptional, intrinsically diverse and its law as a non-uniform legal
field and began to treat it as an integral part of the comparative en-
terprise, profoundly transformed by individual rights and gender
equality notions leading towards greater convergence.
The reluctance of comparative lawyers to undertake unification
projects in Western family law until the late 1980s was a byproduct
of historical and ideological influences. As Harold Gutteridge pointed
out in the late 1940s, the study of comparative family law would al-
low race, religion, and politics to enter into the study of law;
therefore, family law had limited appeal “except for the purpose of
propaganda with which lawyers are not concerned.”1 These words
were cogent in a Europe divided by the Iron Curtain. Although it was
agreed that in Western Europe, U.S. legal influence ought to
predominate in the aftermath of the Marshall Plan, comparative law-
yers who were committed to uniformity and harmonization of legal
rules for markets nevertheless avoided the area of family law.2 In
dealing with politics, religion, and race, a full-fledged comparative
family law analysis would have revealed deep differences between
Europe and the United States on civil rights matters,3 as well as the
1. HAROLD COOKE GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY 32 (1946).
2. See David Bradley, Family Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 259 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
3. See David Bradley, A Note on Comparative Family Law: Problems, Perspec-
tives, Issues and Politics, Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 4, http://ouclf.
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presence of egalitarian and innovative family law reforms in the So-
viet block.4
With these important societal changes and the simultaneous rise
of ideologies about gender equality and individual rights, legislatures
all over the world had to address the inadequacies of family law with
respect to marital breakdowns, children born out of wedlock, and dis-
crimination against non-heterosexual behavior. The rise of individual
freedoms in family law matters became a widespread trend furthered
by transnational women’s and human rights movements.5
If family law played a minor role in those comparative law
projects that mostly focused on the harmonization of Western mar-
kets, this fact changed dramatically with the proliferation of
international human rights and feminist movements in the 1990s.
Suddenly, family law was no longer exceptional to Western projects
of legal harmonization but moved to the center of a discipline now
profoundly committed to individual rights and gender equality.6 The
concurrent trends addressing family law problems, not only from a
national but also from an international level, and the sharper focus
on human rights and non-discrimination principles, created a re-
newed emphasis on comparative family law projects pursuing
harmonization. This renewed interest prompted international tribu-
nals, like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), to modify
domestic family law regimes in defining private and family life, the
right to marry, the right to create a family, and the prohibition of
discrimination based on sex, birth, or status.7
Mary Ann Glendon’s introduction to Volume IV of the Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, concluding the work started
in the 1960s by Max Rheinstein, shows that human rights and gen-
der equality ideas at the transnational level are challenged by family
solidarity when translated into individual freedom notions within the
family.8 Because the language of family law has been so profoundly
transformed in past decades, and because family law is now revealing
iuscomp.org/articles/bradley2.shtml; see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (2000) (showing how the
United States was during the Cold War “the presumptive leader of the free world” but
at the same time “racism in the nation was a matter of international concern”).
4. See JOHN QUIGLEY, SOVIET LEGAL INNOVATIONS AND THE LAW OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 103 (2007).
5. See Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law in a Time of Turbulence, in 4 INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3-5 (2006) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]
(“Family law increasingly emphasizes the individuality of family members, as distinct
from the bonds that unite them.”).
6. See Maria Rosaria Marella, The Non-Subversive Function of European Private
Law: The Case of Harmonisation of Family Law, 12 EUR. L. J. 79-81 (2006).
7. See The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, arts. 8, 12, 14, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22.
8. See Glendon, supra note 5, at 5.
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important doctrinal convergences. Part I briefly sketches the emerg-
ing trends in the field, and the methodological problems they entail.
This newfound reliance upon human rights notions in addressing
comparative family law is aptly expressed by Harry Krause’s
statement:
Worldwide treaties, such as the United Nations’ conventions
on human rights, on women, and on the rights of the child,
as well as certain regional conventions, such as the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and the Organization of
American States’ American Convention on Human Rights,
guarantee fundamental rights relating to family life. Often
recognizing rights only in highly abstract terms (consider
the European Convention’s “right to respect for . . . family
life”), these conventions and pronouncements have signifi-
cant impact in encouraging commonalities in family law
principles across national boundaries.9
This shift to human rights and fundamental principles enshrined
in constitutional regimes has enlisted the family as a fundamental
field for comparative and international law projects addressing the
possibilities for convergence, unification, and harmonization of family
law.
A. Unification, Harmonization, and Convergence in Contemporary
Comparative Family Law
Since the early 1900s, there has been widespread skepticism
about the possibilities for comparative lawyers to unify norms in fam-
ily law. Lord Justice Kennedy’s remarks in advocating unification in
the commercial realm depict a common sentiment:
The practical questions still remain, Is the unification of law
feasible? What, if anything, has been already done in that
direction? I am afraid that in regard to the personal law, so
far as regards the most important questions of marriage and
divorce, there is no immediate or even near prospect of suc-
cess. Differences of traditional usage, religious and
ecclesiastical discipline, and popular sentiment in regard to
the rights and duties which are involved in the family tie,
prevail so widely and are so closely cherished that any at-
tempt to unify law in this direction by international
agreement has at present a poor prospect of success.10
9. Harry D. Krause, Comparative Family Law: Past Traditions Battle Future
Trends—and Vice Versa, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1099 (Ma-
thias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
10. Lord Justice Kennedy, The Unification of Law, 10 J. SOC’Y. COMP. LEGIS. NEW
SERIES 212, 216 (1909).
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Despite the initial skepticism regarding the unification of family
law, after WWII, some scholars began to address the possibility of
unifying family law regimes, especially in Western Europe, with a
regional rather than a universal focus.11 Wolfram Müller Freienfels
highlighted that unification was driven by international legal instru-
ments often through conflict-of-laws mechanisms rather than
substantive laws:
Unification of conflicts rules affecting family law is a less
ambitious undertaking than unification of substantive fam-
ily law itself. Substantive unification seeks to eliminate
diversity between the various legal systems, but conflicts
rules presuppose that diversity exists. The only goal of unifi-
cation of conflicts rules is to determine that any case
involving aspects of foreign law will be decided under the
same legal rules whatever the court in which it is tried, thus
ensuring uniformity in outcome. In other words, it is dedi-
cated to elimination of choice of court as a determining factor
in the decision of a case on the merits, thus, eliminating so-
called forum shopping. Accordingly, unification of conflicts
law has only secondary importance in comparison to the
more sweeping aims of unification of substantive law.12
In a similar vein, addressing the functional role of conflict-of-laws in
the European Union (EU), Dieter Martiny explains that “[t]he
harmonisation of European private international law can . . . only be
considered as an intermediate step along the path to more
integration.”13
Today, the very “European” project of family law harmonization
is addressing some crucial choices about which divorce, marriage,
and property regimes should prevail in EU countries that have al-
ready deeply harmonized their market laws.14 For instance, family
law harmonizers have focused on common principles of marriage, di-
11. See Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, The Unification of Family Law, 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 187 (1969).
12. Id. at 205.
13. Dieter Martiny, Is Unification of Family Law Feasible or Even Desirable,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1612157.
14. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, Methodological Aspects of Harmonisation of Family
Law, in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN
EUROPE 156-58 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2003); see also Masha Antokolskaia, The
“Better Law” Approach and the Harmonisation of Family Law, in PERSPECTIVES FOR
THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, supra, 161, 169-72.
But see Nancy G. Maxwell, Unification and Harmonization of Family Law Principle:
The United States Experience, in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISA-
TION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, supra, 249-55 (advancing a more skeptical view on
the harmonization of family law in the United States).
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vorce, and communal property in Europe.15 In acting independently
of the main EU institutions in Brussels, these scholars have adopted
an approach similar to that used by the European Commission for
the harmonization of contract and tort law, i.e., they have defined
family law rules as a matter merely of private law.16
By rooting this idea in the traditional law of persons, family law
is construed as either a set of human rights, or as a set of conflict-of-
laws provisions to deal with marriage and property regimes in trans-
national legal settings.17 These projects on the harmonization of
family law have flourished and legitimized European governance not
only by harmonizing the law of the single market, but also of the fam-
ily. This contribution by European scholarship is timely because it
matches an important shift in adjudication of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in relation to free movement of workers.18 While the
ECJ was initially hesitant with regard to federalizing family law
rules in the common market, some of its recent judgments have
openly interpreted domestic marriage as well as immigration law re-
gimes that had previously been considered primarily a matter of
Member State competence.19 Thus, some scholars and judges in the
EU favor a harmonizing project that will no longer exclude the family
from the Europeanization of the common market.
Like the unification story, the notion of convergence of family law
regimes—especially in Western Europe—developed from initial skep-
ticism to great hopes. As John Henry Merryman noted in advocating
convergence:
15. See KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW
REGARDING DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES (2004).
16. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Principles of European Family Law: Its
Aims and Prospects, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 161-62 (2005); see also Katharina Boele-
Woelki, The Working Method of the Commission on European Family Law, in COM-
MON CORE AND BETTER LAW IN EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed.,
2005) (explaining that the principles are methodologically similar to the approach
adopted by the other groups advocating for the harmonization of private law).
17. Compare Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, Human Rights and the Harmonization of
Family Law in Europe, in EUROPEAN CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW
(Katherina Boele-Woelki ed., 2008) with Anna Horı́nová, Property Relations Between
Spouses in the Legislation of the Czech Republic and that of Selected Post-Communist
Countries, in EUROPEAN CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, supra.
18. Compare Case C-370/90, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal & Surinder
Singh, ex parte Home Sec’y, 1992 E.C.R I-4265 (demonstrating the jurisprudential
shift in ECJ jurisprudence on free movement of workers) and Case C-109/01, Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t v. Akrich, 2003 E.C.R I-9607 (illustrating a narrow interpre-
tation of the right to marry and family law) with Case C-60/00 Carpenter v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R I-6279 and C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock
and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equal. and Law Reform, 3 C.M.L.R. 39 (2008)
(showcasing a broader analysis of family law rights and the competence to enter into
family matters by the ECJ).
19. See Helen Stalford, Concepts of Family Under EU Law—Lessons from the
ECHR, 16 INT. J.L., POLICY & THE FAMILY 410-13 (2002).
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. . . a particularizing force is powerfully at work, opposing
uniformity, standardization, and the loss of those character-
istics by which people define themselves and establish their
unique identities. We see it in the emphasis placed on spe-
cific attributes of politics, history, language and culture.
People’s loyalties are commanded by regional, ethnic, organi-
zational, job, religious, class, sex, age, and other social-
political-ideological affiliations.20
Thus, according to Merryman, comparative lawyers bear an im-
portant task in pursuing convergence and the idea that the drive
towards universal regimes is a progressive one has become central to
scholars committed to the harmonization of European family law.21
In the late 1970s, the groundbreaking work of Mary Ann Glen-
don challenged the possibility of a full-fledged comparative family
law analysis inter alia because of the great disparity in abortion regu-
lation throughout Western Europe,22 but it also opened an important
avenue for comparative family law work. In following Glendon’s ap-
proach, based on the inevitable convergence of family law regimes in
the West driven by constitutional and human right courts, today con-
stitutional court decisions all over the world are increasingly shaping
family law through concepts of privacy and dignity that regulate inti-
macy and reproductive rights.23 Unsurprisingly, critical family law
questions have become part of the comparative constitutional law ca-
non. For example, the abortion decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the German Constitutional Court appear in most of the compara-
tive constitutional law casebooks.24 These books have a strong
Western geographical focus, which includes France, Canada, and
(sometimes) Poland; Latin America, Africa, and Asia are often foreign
to these comparative studies.25
One casebook expands its family focus to encompass sexuality
and marriage by including decisions from Australia, South Africa,
and the ECtHR. These cases allow the casebook authors to address
the rights of children, parents, and homosexual couples as an expan-
20. John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law
and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357, 372 (1981).
21. See Schwenzer, supra note 14, at 143, x, 148. R
22. See MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1977); see also MARY ANN GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
23. See Rachel Rébouche, The Limits of Reproductive Rights in Improving Wo-
men’s Health, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2010).
24. See, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1, 110 (2d ed. 2006).
25. See MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW 871 (3d ed. 2006);
see also NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS 617, 632, 646 (2d ed. 2010).
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sion of family relations.26 The groundbreaking work of the ECtHR
has led scholars to discuss the convergence within Western family
law in the areas where the Court did not recognize a margin of appre-
ciation for the states, but rather sanctioned a universal principle.27
For instance, in 2008, the ECtHR decided that a single parent al-
lowed to adopt a child under French law could not be discriminated
against on the basis of her sex life, in particular, because of her homo-
sexuality.28 In its previous 2002 judgment, the ECtHR had held there
was no discrimination against a homosexual parent who was refused
the right to adopt by French authorities.29 In contrast, the Court now
held that there had been discrimination vis-à-vis a single parent ap-
plying for and being denied the right to adopt.30
Although the ECtHR jurisprudence can signal where conver-
gence is taking place, it occurs at various rates and through
conflicting values. These values are reflected in the tensions arising
between local and transnational judicial elites rather than in peace-
ful compromises.31 For example, the decision of the French
administrative tribunal allowing Ms. E.B. to adopt a minor went
much further than the European judgment, which, however, it did
not cite. In allowing the lesbian single parent to adopt the child, the
French tribunal, rather than citing the human rights convention,
found that the lesbian couple familial context in which the child
would be raised would be harmonious and suitable to the child’s
needs.32
26. See DORSEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 646 (including the family as “[a]nother
aspect of one’s identity” and suggesting that “[t]he term often connotes age-related
dependency as well as other hierarchies” so that “fundamental rights may have to be
balanced in complex ways”).
27. See Glendon, supra note 5, at 6, 16 (citing the fact that despite the increasing
number of European countries recognizing same-sex marriages, the European Court
of Human Rights has nevertheless limited its definition of “marriage” to the union of
a man and a woman).
28. See E.B. v. France (App. No. 43546/02) Eur. Cr. H.R., slip op. at ¶ 94 (2008)
(“The Court points out that French law allows single persons to adopt a child thereby
opening up the possibility of adoption by a single homosexual, which is not disputed.
Against the background of the domestic legal provisions, it considers that the reasons
put forward by the Government cannot be regarded as particularly convincing and
weighty such as to justify refusing to grant the applicant authorization.”), http://www.
echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/ECHR+Publications/Information+notes+on+the+Courts+case-
law/Information+Note+Home+page/.
29. See Frettè v. France, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 345 (2002), available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/ECHR+Publications/Information+notes+on+the+Courts+case-
law/Information+Note+Home+page/.
30. See Elena Falletti, The European Court of Human Rights and the Right to
Adoption of Homosexual Single Persons, 6-9 (on file with the author).
31. See Fernanda Nicola, Liability in the Bedroom: Converging Doctrines and Di-
verging Ideologies in the United States, France and Italy, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the underlying conflicts to what appears a
doctrinal convergence on no fault divorce regimes).
32. See TA Besançon, Nov. 10, 2009, JurisData n° 2009-013799, 5 (“Le rapport de
la psychologue indique que: « Le couple témoigne d’une réelle complémentarité. Si
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B. The Relevance of Method in Comparative Family Law
Among the comparative methods, there is still today the wide-
spread use of what we may call a “comparative law by columns”
approach, whose main objective is to describe the positive law of dif-
ferent countries. This approach aims to compare positive legal rules,
whether in a code or in case law, by dissociating them from their con-
text. A comparison by columns is simply a method of comparing the
language of legal norms understood as positive law in specific legal
regimes.
Asking a general legal question such as “at what age can individ-
uals get married?”, we can compare the responses in every nation of
the world. Thus, comparative law by columns entails a static inquiry
limited to specific provisions, requiring a limited (or no) engagement
with legal cultures or traditional and informal legal regimes. The
task of the comparative lawyer is to draw a chart with several col-
umns, each representing a country. Once the chart is completed and
filled with detailed information regarding domestic rules on the
books, the comparative lawyer begins to compare and contrast in or-
der to fully describe the status of a particular legal rule or doctrine.
Although it presents law in the books rather than law in action, this
had long remained the quintessential comparative law methodology.
Despite its positivist limitations and global aspirations, comparative
law by columns is still widely used as an informative tool in world-
wide surveys. An example is the Encyclopaedic Comparison, as
Günter Frankenberg calls it,33 in Volume IV of the International En-
cyclopedia of Comparative Law on Persons and Family. It offers a
splendid example of comparative law by columns in its treatment of
the Formation of Marriage.34 This text devotes all of its third chapter
to the formation of marriage. There, we see a comparison by columns
of age restrictions and parental consent requirements for marriage in
France, England, and Algeria, with a tendency towards convergence
between the first two nations, though not the last.35
Since the first half of the twentieth century, comparative lawyers
have sought to overcome the major problems inherent in comparative
law by columns. They have objected, first, that this static method is
entirely indifferent to what happens in practice and in the implemen-
elles partagent des valeurs commines, chacune affiche sa singularité . . . . Les rôles de
chacun s’harmonisent autour d’un projet réfléchi. L’enfant semple véritablement au
cœur de leurs préoccupations.”).
33. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 427, 429 (1985) (“By contrast, the doctrinal comparatist
pursues a less ambitious goal. She takes the law of each society as a body of (poten-
tially) coherent precepts and tries to fill the gaps or to strengthen out inconsistencies
in the domestic law by cross cultural comparison.”).
34. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 5.
35. Dagmar Coester-Waltjen & Michale Coester, Formation of Marriage, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, supra note 5, at 15-23.
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tation of legal norms described in each column. Second, they have
criticized it for portraying legal systems as isolated legal islands
rather than as entities influenced by a broader legal culture or form
of rationality. Finally, comparative law by columns came to be re-
garded as overly selective, admitting limited information while also
omitting the socio-economic context, resulting in an inability to con-
sider legal reality.
Mathias Reimann noted:
Today, we understand that when we compare rules, we must
take a functional approach, i.e., analyze not only what rules
say but also what problems they solve in their respective le-
gal systems. We realize that we need to consider rules in
context . . . . [W]e must go way beyond mere rule comparison.
These insights may have been novel three generations ago
but, today, every self-respecting comparative lawyer can be
expected to know them.36
Despite this insight, comparative law by columns remains a wide-
spread technique for collecting basic information about different legal
systems.
A contemporary example of comparative law by columns is the
recent World Bank approach to “gender laws.” The Bank has em-
braced family law among its reform projects because the field is so
relevant to “Doing Business” in developing countries.37 The World
Bank has collected a massive amount of positive law on marriage and
inheritance rules worldwide through a country-by-country report,
mostly driven by the wish to increase efficiency in the marketplace:
. . . the Doing Business Gender Project is identifying laws
and regulations that discriminate against women, compiling
a database of relevant laws that governments can use as re-
form tools and singling out reforms that have delivered the
biggest benefits for women. The project also intends to pub-
lish case studies on women entrepreneurs that describe the
reasons for their success and the main obstacles they face in
expanding their businesses.38
36. See Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the
Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 671, 679-80 (2002).
37. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT/
THE WORLD BANK, WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW: MEASURING LEGAL GENDER PAR-
ITY FOR ENTERPRENEURS AND WORKERS IN 128 ECONOMIES (2010), available at http://
wbl.worldbank.org/documents/Women-Business-Law.pdf (focusing on gender differ-
ences in legal treatment in 128 economies, using six different indicators).
38. Gender Action Plan Newsletter—Gender Equality as Smart Economics, THE
WORLD BANK (2008), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
EXTGENDER/0,,contentMDK:21685760~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:
336868,00.html#doing_business (last visited July 15, 2010).
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In addition to comparing by columns, this World Bank collection
reflects the overall skepticism of lawyers vis-à-vis comparative family
law. In particular, the World Bank report on families highlights the
drawbacks of an early age for marriage, which often entails limiting
women’s ability to enter the marketplace due to childbearing tasks.
However, it also warns of the limited impact of reforming family law
rules to prevent early marriages because of the overwhelming power
of tradition and customary regimes.39 By thus acknowledging the lo-
calized and traditional aspects of family law in different countries,
the World Bank supports the idea that family law is special and that
attempts to reform it have only limited impact.
II. FAMILY LAW EXCEPTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE LAW: AN
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
At the birth of the Western comparative law tradition in the
early twentieth century, family law was often a contested field, espe-
cially among private lawyers who understood the law of the family to
be distinct from the universal and individualistic law of the market
because it carried with it a set of highly organic, moral, and localized
values.40 Family law was considered exceptional by comparative law-
yers in one of two ways: the family was either marginalized by
comparative law projects committed to harmonization, or it was the
central focus of comparative inquiries concentrating on legal plural-
ism in different societies. This chapter traces the genealogy of family
law exceptionalism in comparative law, beginning approximately
with Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws,41 and examining its de-
velopment up to the ideas put forward in recent World Bank
reports—namely that family law regimes, especially beyond the
West, are intrinsically hard to reform because they are embedded in
local morality, in religion and in traditional values.
A. The Market/Family Dichotomy in Western Comparative Law
The idea that the family is the quintessential entity to display
local customs, traditions, and even climatic influences begins with
the famous Book 16 of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, in which
he explains:
Women are marriageable in hot climates at eight, nine,
and ten years of age; thus, childhood and marriage almost
39. See WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS: WOMEN IN AFRICA 2 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/Women_in_Africa.pdf (noting that, in
Cameroon, “a husband may still formally object to his wife’s exercise of a trade or
profession if he judges it is not in the interest of their marriage or children”).
40. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 259-72.
41. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 264-77 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
trans., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (1748).
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always go together there. They are old at twenty: thus rea-
son in women is never found with beauty there. . . . .
Therefore, when reason does not oppose it, it is very simple
there for a man to leave his wife to take another and for po-
lygamy to be introduced.
In temperate countries, where women’s charms are bet-
ter preserved, where they become marriageable later, and
where they have children at a more advanced age, their hus-
bands’ old age more or less follows their own; and, as they
have more reason and knowledge there when they marry, if
only because they have lived longer, a kind of equality be-
tween the two sexes has naturally been introduced, and
consequently the law permitting only a single wife.
In cold countries, the almost necessary use of strong
drink establishes intemperance among the men; so women,
who have a natural reserve in this respect because they
must always defend themselves, again have the advantage
of reason over the men.42
As Otto Kahn-Freund explains, the relevance of Montesquieu’s
analysis for comparative lawyers is the idea of family law
exceptionalism:
One would have thought that no subject of legal regula-
tion was more likely to prove the validity of Montesquieu’s
warning and of his catalogue of determinants than the fam-
ily, and marriage in particular. What can be closer to the
moral and religious convictions, the habits and the mores
and also the social structure of a community than the mak-
ing and unmaking of marriages, and their effect on the legal
position of the spouses, including their property?43
In the nineteenth century, the ideas put forward by Friedrich Carl
von Savigny and Sir Henry Sumner Maine, as well as the experiences
of continental codifications and the Japanese Civil Code, strength-
ened the idea of an intrinsic difference among Western comparative
lawyers between the market, comprised of commercial and contrac-
tual laws, and family law regimes.
The discourse of Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), which
appeared in his System of Modern Roman Law is analyzed by Duncan
Kennedy in this collection.44 Family law was central to Savigny’s sys-
tem even though it was completely different from the law of
42. Id. at 264-65.
43. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1974).
44. See FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (Wil-
liam Holloway trans., 1979); see also Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony
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obligations or potentialities, such as contract law, because the family
was an organic, irrational, highly moral, and variable institution that
enshrined a civilizational hierarchy in which the modern Christian
family law was superior to all other forms.45 In this structure, family
law was construed largely as public law and as a field less rational
than the private law of obligations, yet more variable and loaded with
local and moral traditions determining the identity of each nation.46
As Duncan Kennedy explains, this Savignian dichotomy fits per-
fectly with the colonial enterprise: colonial powers would harmonize
the law of the market according to Western liberal values, while de-
ferring to local traditions in family law.47 For instance, as Otto Kahn-
Freund noted: “The British rulers introduced in India and in many
colonies the English law of contract, even the criminal law and the
law of civil procedure and of evidence: to introduce the English law of
marriage, of parent-child relation, or of succession, would have been
impossible.”48
In Ancient Law, Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888), the well-
known Victorian jurist, showed the disintegration of the patriarchal
family as a backward and ancient institution based on notions of sta-
tus, while the corporation, based on contractual and individualized
agreements, represented modernity. In Maine’s words: “The move-
ment of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect.
Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual disso-
lution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation
in its place.”49 As Janet Halley explains, marriage was not relevant
in Maine’s evolutionary history, “[b]ut Maine never said that mar-
riage itself was shifting to contract: rather, he ignored marriage
altogether, arguing instead that the replacement of the patriarchal
Family as the basic unit of social life and of economic production by
contract was definitive of modernity.”50 Among Western comparative
lawyers, Maine’s idea reinforced the notion that, rather than focusing
on archaic patriarchal family structures, it was “modern” to look at
Distinction and its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM.
J. COMP. L. 811 (2010) (elucidating the family/patrimony distinction).
45. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 6 (“[A] pervading contrast to family-law here
shows itself. In the two parts of potentiality’s-law, the matter does not, as in the fam-
ily, consist in a natural-moral relation; . . . they belong not to the jus naturale and the
recognition of their existence appears less necessary, more arbitrary and positive,
than in the institutions of family-law.”) (quoting FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYS-
TEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW) supra note 44, at 281-82.
46. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000 in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 32-35
(David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
47. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 3.
48. Kahn-Freund, supra note 43, at 16.
49. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HIS-
TORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 163 (1st ed. New York 1864).
50. Janet Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy, Part I, 22 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. (forthcoming 2010).
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contract and commercial law constituted by universal and individual-
ized rights.
With regard to different codification experiences, the Napoleonic
Code or Code civil failed to introduce the term “family law,” and it
dispersed family law rules in the various books of the code about per-
sons and property.51 Because of this dispersion, Wolfram Müller-
Freienfels explains that today scholars need to introduce the study of
family law in a special way. In fact the study of family law in France
is characterized, in contrast to the law of obligations, as an “attempt
to convey autonomy and peculiarity, the particularisme du droit fa-
milial, and its high dependence on social development.”52
The most prominent example of family law exceptionalism re-
mains its inclusion in the BGB, the German Civil Code of 1900, as a
separate book among five. The division of the family from the rest of
private law was based on the elaborated systematization of the
Pandektensystem, developed by thinkers such as Gustav Hugo, Ar-
nold Heise, and Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who characterized the
family as “an integrated, especially codified part of a conceptually
constructed, coherent inner legal system—a highly developed cul-
tural product.”53
The family law controversy surrounding the Japanese Civil Code
in the late nineteenth century became emblematic of family law ex-
ceptionalism in comparative law.54 In the Meiji period, leaders were
desperate to compile a modern code of law. In 1873, the Japanese
government appointed a French jurist, Gustave Boissonade, to assist
in the drafting of the Japanese Civil Code, but did not intend to en-
trust him with the sections concerning family law.55 Despite this
attempt to ensure that the family law sections were not overly for-
eign, the draft code presented in 1888 remained highly problematic
because it gave individual family members too many rights. For in-
stance, the new draft code proposed that each person should be
registered individually, rather than under a family koseki (family
registry); parental consent was not necessary for marriage between
adults; and a wife could independently take a divorce case to court.56
As a result, in 1890, a draft Civil Code based on the Napoleonic Code
was put forth, but met with vehement opposition from powerful con-
servatives regarding the sections concerning family relations.57 The
51. See Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, The Emergence of Droit de Famille and
Familienrecht in Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family Law in England,
28 J. FAM. HIST. 34-36 (2003).
52. Id. at 36.
53. Id. at 38-39.
54. See Fujiko Isono, The Evolution of Modern Family Law in Japan, 2 INT’L J.L.
& FAM. 183, 185-88 (1988).
55. See id. at 186.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 185.
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provisions concerning familial rights were seen as incompatible with
the Japanese iye system, which expected full obedience of “inferior”
members,58 and was therefore rejected.59 Thus, family law was the
principal area where the “wholesale adoption of a foreign system did
not take effect.”60
In 1893, under continued pressure to modernize in the eyes of
the West, Japan established a committee to prepare a new draft of
the Civil Code.61 One of the selected jurists, Masaki Tomii, was “more
sympathetic to German law and thought it would be more suitable for
Japanese society.”62 Although the new draft was still not ideal for
traditionalists (i.e., it held that after reaching the age of majority,
there was no reason for parental rights to continue), Japan recog-
nized that it had to adopt a Western system of law, so the new draft
was finally accepted in 1898.63 The new Civil Code reflected a com-
promise between iye values and those of “modern law.”64 So, while it
is generally accepted that the Japanese adopted a German-style Civil
Code, scholars have shown that the French influence on the Japanese
Code still persists.65
Finally, an exceptional example of how the market/family dichot-
omy can be put on its head, and how the family can emerge at the
center of the economic structure, comes from traditional China based
on Confucianism ideals. As Teemu Ruskola has shown, “[i]ronically,
while Confucian officialdom was eager to promote the ritual rather
than economic aspects of kinship, its attempts to encourage the main-
tenance of ancestral worship coincidentally provided the kin group
with a means to protect corporate property from dissolution: the in-
stitution of ancestral trust.”66
With this exceptional role of the family law in comparative stud-
ies in mind, and in light of the emerging ideas about the function of
law in society characterizing twentieth century comparative law,
Western lawyers addressed the market/family divide simultaneously
with other dichotomies such as private/public and legal unification/
pluralism.67
58. See id. at 191-92.
59. See id. at 186.
60. Michael Young & Constance Hamilton, Historical Introduction to the Japa-
nese Legal System, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY
27, 33 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2006).
61. See Isono, supra note 54, at 188.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 188-89.
64. Id. at 189.
65. See Young & Hamilton, supra note 60, at 34.
66. Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1630
(2000).
67. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1520 (1983).
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B. Conflicting Methods in Comparative Law: Social-Purpose v.
Positive-Sociology Functionalism
Since the first half of the twentieth century there has been no
consensus in favor of one particular comparative law methodology. At
the first Congrès International de Droit Comparé held in Paris in
1900, comparative lawyers proclaimed the universalist aspirations of
their science.68 Comparative lawyers exported Western legal ideas
into comparative law to mark the emergence of an academic and neu-
tral legal science. Raymond Saleilles declared that the object of
comparative law was the discovery of those norms and principles that
are common to all “civilized nations,” possibly leading to a “partial
unification” of legal regimes.69 Comparative lawyers were to search
for universal rules common to all civilized nations by pursuing an
objective and scientific discipline that was critical of the dogmatism
of the exegetic school in France.70 At the Paris Congress, lawyers jet-
tisoned merely descriptive and de-contextualized comparisons, and
turned wholeheartedly to a functionalist understanding of law.71
They embraced functionalism as an anti-formalist methodology that
could produce the optimal solutions to legal problems. According to
David J. Gerber, Ernst Rabel would later describe this project this
way: “Rather than comparing fixed data and isolated paragraphs, we
compare the solutions produced by one state for a specific factual sit-
uation, and then we ask why they were produced and what success
they had.”72 The functional method offered to comparativists a cure
for the ills of a static legal science in the form of comparative law by
columns.73
With the widespread use of functionalism, two competing ver-
sions emerged, which I will label “social-purpose” and “positive-
sociology” functionalism.74 While the first method was committed to
68. See Symposium, Centennial World Congress on Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 859 (2001).
69. See Raymond Saleilles, Rapport sur l’utilité, le but et le programme du Con-
grès, in CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ TENU A PARIS DU 31 JUILLET AU 4
AOUT 1900, PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES ET DOCUMENTS 9, 43 (1905), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=RIUuAAAAIAAJ.
70. See Christophe Jamin, Le vieux rêve de Saleilles et Lambert revisité. A propos
du centenaire du Congrès international de droit comparé de Paris, 4:52 REVUE INTER-
NATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ  733-51 (2000).
71. See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 9, at 339; see also Michele
Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS
AND TRANSITIONS 100 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
72. David J. Gerber, Sculpting the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and
the Façade of Language, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152, 199
(Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
73. See Arthur von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in
Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1009 (1959).
74. See Michaels, supra note 71 (explaining the different concepts and meanings
encompassed by the functional method).
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legal harmonization, the second was committed to legal pluralism.
Social-purpose functionalists marginalized family law because of
their interest in harmonizing the law of the market, whereas positive
sociologists treated the family as central to their inquiries.
1. Social-Purpose Functionalism
Social-purpose functionalism can be traced back to a jurispru-
dential tradition influenced by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic.
It has its origins in the work of Rudolf von Jhering, Raymond Saleil-
les, and Édouard Lambert in Europe, and of Roscoe Pound in the
United States.75 Despite this transatlantic dialogue, the aims of a
comparative science were clearly universal. Scholars like Pound and
Lambert played an important role of promoting comparative law
studies in post-colonial countries in Asia,76 Latin America,77 and
Northern Africa.78
Social-purpose functionalists promoted solutions guided by pur-
poses that were understood to be neutral and objective, and that
purportedly resulted in the “best solution” to factual problems.79 Ac-
cording to this functionalist method, comparative law provides a
universal view of social life calling for modernization via the resolu-
tion of essentially the same problems in every society. For social-
purpose functionalists, there was no distinction between law and so-
ciety; law was simply a reflection of social change according to a
mirror theory of law and society.80 Consider, for instance, the contri-
bution by Saleilles to the Paris Congress: “The law is at the same
time the foundation and the result of social life,” and the task of the
comparative lawyers is to reach “unity in results within the diversity
of legal forms” so that “each country will contribute to the formation
of a law common to all civilized nations.”81
This unifying purpose behind the Western comparative law tra-
dition was overwhelmingly used to compare private law subjects,
75. See THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD, 1820-
1920 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993); see also Graziadei, supra note 71.
76. See Roscoe Pound, Law and Courts in China: Progress in the Administration
of Justice, 34 A.B.A. J. 273 (1948); see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Roscoe Pound
and Comparative Law, 13 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 507, 515-16 (1964).
77. See Isabel Jaramillo, The Social Approach in Family Law: The Treatise Tradi-
tion in Latin America, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2010) (discussing the influence of the
social-purpose approach on Latin American family law).
78. See Amr Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative Law
in the Arab World, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152, 163-70
(Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
79. See Michaels, supra note 71, at 118-20.
80. See William B. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal
Transplants, 43. AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 492 (1995).
81. See Saleilles, supra note 69, at 170, 178, 181 (author trans.).
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especially contract and commercial law.82 The family linked to the
public sphere did not trigger the same enthusiasm for unification, but
rather raised reservations, particularly when juxtaposed with the
private law (not to mention commercial law) fields. Instead, the di-
chotomy between universal private rules and public law regimes
embedded in local mores resulted in skepticism toward the possibility
of a universal family law.83 For instance, Lambert emphasized the
distinctiveness of family law, explaining that because it was public
law codifying the customs of each nation, it was highly variable and
consequently impossible to harmonize.84 In a similar vein, as David
Bradley explains, English jurists like Sir Frederick Pollock and Fre-
deric William Maitland “were also sceptical that family laws,
representing differences between ‘backward’ and ‘more successful
races,’ followed similar paths.”85
By focusing predominantly on the harmonization of the market
and setting aside the family, social-purpose functionalists viewed the
family as an intrinsically organic and traditional area of law, and
therefore as a field in which unification and convergence were highly
unlikely to succeed.  It was more plausible to harmonize and achieve
a “droit commun législatif” in the law of the market because harmoni-
zation was strictly a rational and scientific enterprise, rather than a
moral and/or political one. Both Saleilles and Lambert used this idea
to justify their own institutional projects, namely, to demonstrate
that the comparative method allowed for both an objective, scientific
investigation of the law of the market in different countries, and for
the historical juristic inquiry into the implicit rationalities of each
legal field.86
In contrast to the universal rationality and individualism of com-
mercial law, family law was still present in their work, although
marked by the stage of civilization, morality, and particular social
purpose of each individual society. For instance, the family law con-
tribution by Eugène Huber at the Paris Congress did not engage with
substantive harmonization, but was rather a conflict of laws survey,
demonstrating that the pluralism existing within Switzerland served
82. See id. at 47 (“Dans le cercle du droit comparé, science sociale, science du
droit, rentrent au même titre le droit public et le droit prive. Dans le cercle di droit
comparé, instrument d’unification or de rapprochement, droit commun législatif, ne
rentre que le seul droit privé”).
83. Saleilles, supra note 69, at 15; see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 260.
84. See Édouard Lambert, Comparative Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 127-29 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931).
85. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 2.
86. See Saleilles, supra note 69, at 60-61 (“M. Saleilles appuie la distinction étab-
lie par M. Lambert, dans son rapport, de deux domaines du droit comparé: L’un
consistant à étudier les institutions anciennes et qui font partie de la sociologie,
l’autre étant plutôt le « droit commun législatif » destiné à dégager, dans les droits
d’origine ou d’évolution parentes, les notions communes et celles qui se forment peu à
peu par l’interprétation du droit”).
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the social purpose of matrimonial regimes, “[t]o retain and to con-
serve the marriage and the family.”87
Social-purpose functionalism stemmed from an organic under-
standing of society entailing an objective vision of legal norms and of
what was best for legal reform, regardless of ideological preferences.
To social-purpose functionalists, the function of law was to further a
particular coherent purpose, such as the healthy social reproduction
of the nation in family law, or the security of transactions in contract
law.88 Once identified, there was no “is versus ought” or “facts versus
ends” distinction; social-purpose functionalists tailored the best doc-
trinal solution to the particular social purpose. Thus, no further
attention was paid to how the envisaged “best” doctrinal solution
would solve social problems in different social contexts. This short-
coming led to criticism, and ultimately to a departure, a second wave:
the positive-sociology functionalist approach broke off the parent tra-
dition, proposing a different methodology in comparative law.89
2. Positive-Sociology Functionalism
A second type of functionalism, both less normative and more de-
scriptive than social-purpose functionalism, was rooted in positive
sociology.  According to positive-sociology functionalism, law re-
mained relatively autonomous from social reality. Scholars like Karl
Llewellyn, Max Rheinstein, and Otto Kahn-Freund portrayed the
family as exceptional, inherently distinct, and not harmonizable, but
still central to comparative law inquiry.90 With guidance from the so-
cial rather than legal sciences, these scholars attempted to develop a
value-neutral approach to understanding the pluralism and diversity
of family law regimes.
In sharp contrast to the social-purpose functionalists with their
organic understanding of society, positive-sociology functionalists
emphasized that law not only reflects, but also cultivates social
change.91 This second type of functionalism was influenced by Max
Weber in Europe and by legal realism in the United States. Pursuant
87. See Eugène Huber, Les régimes matrimoniaux des cantons suisses, in 2 CON-
GRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ TENU A PARIS DU 31 JUILLET AU 4 AOUT 1900,
PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES ET DOCUMENTS 206, 208 (1905) (author trans.).
88. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697,
707 (1930) (“It is just unreal and unjustifiably dogmatic to refuse to recognize the
function of the quest for certainty as contributing to the general security.”).
89. See M.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 173-222 (1997) (showing a similar divergence in American
Legal thought and detailing the controversy between Roscoe Pound and Karl
Llewellyn).
90. See Otto Kahn-Freund, Common Law and Civil Law—Imaginary and Real
Obstacles to Assimilation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 138
(M. Cappelletti ed., 1978).
91. See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1235-38 (1931).
\\server05\productn\C\COM\58-4\COM409.txt unknown Seq: 20 23-SEP-10 12:24
796 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 58
to this approach, comparativists engaged in the meticulous study of
hidden legal regimes and bureaucratic mechanisms that could better
explain political results and more general social phenomena.92 Ac-
cording to them, legal solutions were guided not by the objective
choice of the right rule for each social purpose, but by political
choices.93 In criticizing the vagueness of social purposes identified by
the prior school of functionalism,94 these scholars were committed to
revealing two new levels of complexity: possible conflicts between op-
posing social purposes (for example, the goal of the healthy
reproduction of a nation might conflict with the goal of marital stabil-
ity) and ideological disagreements about what social purposes meant
for Catholics, Fascists or those aligned with the Right or Left. In this
vein, Llewellyn expressed his deep disagreement with social-purpose
functionalism in his response to Pound:
“What can be done,” and by whom? I have spoken of law as a
means: whose means, to whose end? Discussions of law, like
discussions of “social control,” tend a little lightly to assume
“a society” and to assume the antecedent discovery of “social”
objectives . . . . There is, amid the welter of self-serving
groups, clamoring and struggling over this machine that will
give power over others, the recurrent emergence of some
wholeness, some sense of responsibility which outruns en-
lightened self-interest, and results in action apparently
headed (often purposefully) for the common good.95
Another point of departure from social-purpose functionalism
was an unwillingness to accept abstract doctrinal solutions, and in-
stead a desire for pragmatic solutions attuned to different contexts.
Thus, a positive-sociology functionalist would not put forth a doctri-
nal solution before undertaking a very elaborate factual and
anthropological inquiry into the social reality in which each rule ap-
plies.96 The comparative lawyer was encouraged to engage with
economists, sociologists, and anthropologists who could better inform
her about the impact of legal rules on the behavior of individuals,
groups, religious communities, and even animals.97
92. See MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Edward Shils & Max
Rheinstein trans., Max Rheinstein ed., 1967); see also THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006) (discussing Legal Real-
ism in American Legal Thought).
93. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431, 431-33, 451, 464-65 (1930).
94. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 615-16
(1908).
95. See Llewellyn, supra note 93, at 461. R
96. See K.N. LLEWELLYN & E.A. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); see also Max
Rheinstein, The Need for Research in Family Law, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 691 (1949).
97. See René Köning, Sociological Introduction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 5, at
20:
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From this perspective, family law, like the law of the market,
was an important, but not unique field, reflecting a rich interchange
between legal, kinship, sociological, and moral values. Comparative
lawyers in this positive-sociology tradition were highly committed to
interdisciplinary perspectives and the social sciences, especially to
anthropology.98
Family law became the place par excellence to study legal plural-
ism and local mores, and this method was committed to showing how
different legal norms entail distinct cultural values and diverse forms
of rationality. Rheinstein, for instance, argued that family law re-
quired not merely equal but special attention from legal scholars:
Family law has never attracted that concentrated effort
of the legal profession which has been lavished upon busi-
ness law, constitutional law, administrative law, labour law,
and other fields connected with burning political issues or
the interests of powerful economic groups. Yet family law in-
fluences the lives of everybody more deeply than any of these
fields.99
Both Llewellyn and Rheinstein analyzed how families actually
functioned in different societies—the “is,” or the function they per-
formed at the factual level.100 In addition, they deeply contextualized
the legal rules in the complex social reality in which these rules were
operating. Only after they were satisfied that they sufficiently under-
stood the function that family rules played in each complex reality
would they announce their reform proposals. Such a proposal en-
tailed how legal rules should be reformed so that family law could
change according to the desired normative outcomes, and was nar-
rowly tailored for each social reality. According to Rheinstein, family
law—more than other private law disciplines—was inherently unsta-
ble and in a continuous flux because of its sensitivity to social,
On a purely formal level a correspondence in the elementary forms of the
human and animal families is obvious. We speak of: (a) the parental family,
when both parents jointly rear offspring (e.g., Gibbon); (b) the paternal fam-
ily; (c) the maternal family, when the father (e.g., many fishes) or the mother
(e.g., bear) respectively rears the offspring; (d) the youth family, when the
progeny, after a more or less long period of adaptation with one or both par-
ents, gets along by itself (e.g., many birds).
98. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 43, at 1-2; see also Max Rheinstein, Teaching
Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1938); Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law:
Its Functions, Methods and Usages, 22 ARK. L. REV. 415 (1968).
99. Rheinstein, supra note 96, at 691.
100. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1307 (1932); see also Karl Llwellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 249 (1933); Max Rheinstein, The Family and the Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 5, at 15 (writing a relatively short but dense legal introduction to the volume
that begins with a survey of the place of family law in the world. He then highlights
that one of the peculiarities of this field is its constant change, which he describes as
“[f]amily law in flux.”).
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political, and legal reforms.101 Family law’s exceptionalism required
a social science as well as a comparativist inquiry because, as Rhein-
stein put it, “[t]he family is what sociologists call a primary group. It
is a social institution, which simply exists. Its structure is deter-
mined pre-legally. It has existed long before Law was invented as a
special technique of social ordering.”102
This interdisciplinary and pluralist approach to comparative law
led social-purpose functionalists to look beyond harmony or unifica-
tion of the law (the goals of social-purpose functionalists) and rather
to look for differences characterising legal regimes with the help of
social, rather than legal, science.
C. Family Law at the Margins and in the Center: David versus
Rheinstein
The conflict between the two types of functionalist methods con-
tinued after WWII in the works of two prominent comparative
lawyers, René David and Max Rheinstein. This Part explains that
while David pursued the social-purpose functionalist method, and
placed family law at the margin, consistent with the tradition com-
mitted to the unification and harmonization of legal rules in order to
serve the social function of Western markets, Rheinstein moved on to
positive-sociology functionalism and placed family law at the crux of
his comparative law project.
1. René David
The work of René David made a culturally attuned contribution
to the field of comparative law in the form of a major study of the
different “legal families” in the world.103 In addition to the Roman-
Germanic and Anglo-American families, David identified Socialist,
Islamic, Indian, African, Latin American, and Far East legal families.
Using this legal families approach, David addressed cultural and le-
gal differences all over the world. Tracing the genealogy of David’s
contribution to the field is complex. His work also had important ties
to Lambert’s legacy, and exhibited similarities with social-purpose
functionalism in several ways.
First, David’s subdivision of the legal families allowed compara-
tive lawyers to talk about the logic of each family in a scientific way,
regardless of whether that family was Socialist or Islamic. David’s
approach thus opened the comparative law inquiry regarding legal
101. See Glendon, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining how Rheinstein’s work showed
that “the legal images of the family that prevailed in the developed countries were
everywhere more in touch with the ideas and practices of the middle classes than the
poor or well-to-do”).
102. Rheinstein, supra note 100, at 4. R
103. See RENÉ DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (John E.C. Brierley trans., 1964).
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families beyond the West by introducing a new legal rationality to
talk about Indian, Islamic, and African law.104 David’s intuitive
transformation of comparative law into a global enterprise has
proven to be a fundamental contribution that shaped the discipline.
Second, David’s work was not limited to the investigation of dif-
ferent legal families; as a legal practitioner, he was highly committed
to the unification of the markets through commercial harmonization
projects aimed at selecting the rules that best performed the social
function of the respective institution.105 David’s commitment to tech-
nical efforts to harmonize legal regimes was marked by his practical
engagement in unification projects launched by the Institute for the
Unification of Private Law or UNIDROIT.106 David’s work on unifica-
tion and search for best solutions was highly influenced by the social-
purpose functionalist methodology.
Finally, through his notion that it was possible to harmonize the
rules of the market but not the rules of the family, David’s work re-
produced the market/family dichotomy not only in the West, but in
each legal family. An example is David’s work on Africa in 1954,
when he was tasked by the Emperor, S.M. Haile Sellassie, with draft-
ing an entirly new Civil Code for Ethiopia. This work eventually led
to his volume on family law in the Ethiopian Civil Code.107 As he
explained in his article on the difficulties of teaching law in Ethiopia,
in addition to scant resources, law schools, and professional lawyers,
“[a] comparativist needs to bear in mind that the understanding of
the rule of law in Ethiopia was minimal and very different from the
Western one in the twentieth century.”108
However, David’s initial skepticism about the codification of fam-
ily law was due not only to his negligible knowledge of Ethiopian
traditions and local customs, but also to the reproduction of the mar-
ket/family dichotomy within the African family; this translated into
his belief in the highly local, organic, and variable nature of family
law, and the subsequent impossibility and resistance to its codifica-
104. See id.
105. See René David, Le Droit du Commerce International: Une nouvelle tâche
pour les législateurs nationaux ou une nouvelle ‘lex mercatoria,’ in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1977); see also RENÉ DAVID, LE DROIT COMPARÉ:
DROITS D’HIER, DROITS DE DEMAIN, 30-38 (ECONOMICA, Paris 1982).
106. See Jorge L. Esquirol, René David at the Head of the Legal Family, in RE-
THINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 212, 235 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001)
(explaining that David’s spectacular ability was promoting his transnational legal en-
terprises “through institutionally-entrenched practices presented as neutral, as
common sense”).
107. See RENÉ DAVID, LE DROIT DE LA FAMILLE DANS LE CODE CIVIL ETHIOPIEN
(1976).
108. Id. at 4 (author trans.); see also René David, L’Enseignement du Droit en Ethi-
opie, 6 J. AFR. L. 96 (1962).
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tion.109 In eventually codifying Ethiopian family law, David aimed to
reconcile the values of the different religious traditions predominant
in Ethiopia with the secular rules regulating the family in the Code
civil:
En ce qui concerne Musulmans et Chrétiens mêmes, l’on
ne peut s’attendre à ce que les uns et les autres se confor-
ment, touchant leurs relations de famille, à des dispositions
qui ne sont pas celles de leurs coutumes. Le code civil
cependant n’est pas de ce fait inutile. Il propose un modèle,
moins rigide que celui du Fetha Negast, à des juges qui, dans
une large mesure, sont appelés aujourd’hui comme hier à
statuer selon l’équité. Il n’était guère possible, en ce
domaine, de faire plus.110
The result was a series of compromises with little hope that the
code would lead to a real convergence of the family law regimes
deeply embedded in different religious traditions. Therefore, David
maintained religious marriage, and while he was aware that custom-
ary marriage remained a valid and predominant practice, he
nevertheless introduced civil marriage. He also introduced a legal ac-
tion for divorce into a society where divorce was beginning to spread
in practice but was not yet formally recognized by religious
authorities.111
To mediate the tensions inherent in the introduction of the insti-
tution of divorce, David explained that he departed from a
widespread Western liberal conception of divorce present in the
French Civil Code by introducing a new concept of “cause grave.”112
Divorce was possible only if justified by an “aggravated situation,”
which meant serious misconduct of one of the spouses, who was then
pursued criminally for having caused the marital breakdown. As
David explained, behind these differences there were deep cultural
reasons:
Un incident de la discussion relative au divorce m’est
demeuré dans la mémoire. La commission n’avait pas retenu
109. See John Hazard, Book Review, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 584 (1987) (reviewing
RENÉ DAVID, LES AVATARS D’UN COMPARATISTE).
110. RENÉ DAVID, LES AVATARS D’UN COMPARATISTE 175 (1982) (“With respect to
Muslims and Christians alike, it cannot be expected they will comply with some fam-
ily law precepts that are not consistent with their respective customs. But this does
not render the civil code useless. The code offers a less rigid model than the Fetha
Negast to judges who are asked today, as they were yesterday, to decide—in signifi-
cant measure—according to principles of equity. In this field, it was hardly possible to
do more.”) (author trans.).
111. See DAVID, supra note 107. R
112. Id. at 5 (showing that what David meant by Western liberal conception was
the French Civil Code definition of marriage as a contract that could come to an end
by voluntary consent of both parties or by aggravated breach).
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comme cause suffisante de divorce la condamnation pénale
d’un des époux, mais elle avait admis comme telle en re-
vanche la maladie incurable, la lèpre ou la folie. Je m’en
étonnai. La raison m’en fut vite donnée: la peine de prison,
me dit-on, est prononcée par les hommes, la maladie est en-
voyée par Dieu. Les Ethiopiens, lorsqu’ils apprennent qu’une
personne est malade, disent : « Que Dieu lui pardonne! »113
This explains why aggravated breach or “cause grave” divorce,
which, David clearly thought, closely reflected local moral ideas, was
introduced in the Ethiopian Civil Code.
2. Max Rheinstein
The positive-sociology intervention in comparative law became
central to the rising “divorce crisis” lasting throughout the twentieth
century. In the United States, Llewellyn’s famous articles on divorce
of 1932-1933 highlighted the idea that law has influenced the chang-
ing social and economic attitudes toward divorce. Llewellyn proposed
to look “Behind the Law of Divorce” and to reassess the ideologies and
the functions that marriage performs in a society.114 This led him to
examine the myriad ways in which marriage and divorce influence
the division of property and other assets between men and women,
the old and young, and a whole array of diversely motivated
individuals.
Rheinstein followed Llewellyn by urging a major inquiry into di-
vorce among family law experts in the United States. He showed
that, despite the attempt to create more individual rights for women
through the Married Women’s Property Law Acts, the family still
functioned as a primary social unit. Studying the transformations of
family law by separating the “is” from the “ought,” Rheinstein fo-
cused on the reality of family law and the existence of opposing
ideologies about marriage. In that conflict, a “compromise has been
brought about by the coexistence of a strict divorce law of the books
and a law of easy divorce in action.”115 Careful about what rules to
reform and what normative goals to achieve, Rheinstein pointed out
that updated laws on the books often created unintended effects in
113. DAVID, supra note 110, at 174 (“One anecdote about the debates over divorce R
remains vivid in my memory. The commission did not consider the criminal conviction
of a spouse to constitute grounds for divorce; on the other hand, it did consider an
incurable disease, such as leprosy or insanity, to constitute sufficient grounds. I was
astonished. The reason was promptly explained: I was told that while a prison sen-
tence is pronounced by men, disease is sent by God. When Ethiopians find out that
someone is ill, they say: ‘May God forgive him!’”) (author trans.).
114. See Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce I and II, supra note 100. R
115. Max Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAND. L. REV.
239, 252 (1964).
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the relations of married couples vis-à-vis creditors in cases of divorce
and bankruptcy.116
Rheinstein’s introduction to his 1972 book, Marriage Stability,
Divorce and the Law, opened with the Weberian distinction between
Islamic and Judaic traditions, and emphasized how material ration-
ality influenced the rules of law that give expression to religious
tenets.117 In contrast, formal rationality was characteristic of the re-
vived Roman law in both common and civil law. In his comparative
enterprise, Rheinstein surveyed how different legal regimes have re-
sponded with diverse social, economic, and political outcomes to
marital breakdown, and highlighted more or less effective remedies.
Rheinstein was ready for paradoxes in his comparative analysis of
marital breakdowns:
The breakdown of a home often constitutes a catastrophe for
spouses and their children. If it occurs frequently, it can in-
deed be regarded as a social evil. But the restoration to the
freedom of remarriage is by no means necessarily evil. In
fact, it can be good for society as it reopens the way for the
creation of new homes for ex-spouses and their children, a
home which is free from the taint of irregularity and which
at least holds the possibility of being more harmonius than
that which has broken down.118
Rheinstein aimed to show how legal regimes refusing to recog-
nize legal divorce lagged behind modern society, where marital
breakdowns were frequent. As he outlined in his detailed research,
despite this legislative gap, courts from Japan to Germany and the
United States were handling the negotiation between divorcing
spouses. In Rheinstein’s foreword to Mary Ann Glendon’s book in
1977, he stated:
So what prevailed for decades was a contrast between the
law in the books and the law in action, a compromise be-
tween the forces of conservation oriented to Christian
traditions held to be inviolable and “modern” individualism
oriented to the right of pursuit of happiness, a compromise
that was worked out not in the halls of the legislatures but
in the rooms of divorce courts.119
116. Rheinstein, supra note 96, at 694-95 (pinpointing where Rheinstein came to
this assessment of 1940’s patrimonial and marital regimes: “[W]hile fitting well the
needs of people in the top brackets of the property and income structure, the present
law is ill-suited for the middle classes, the workers and the farm population.”).
117. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 18-22
(1972).
118. Id. at 5.
119. Max Rheinstein, Foreword to MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY:
FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE vii (1977).
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Rheinstein’s focus on the real functions of family law in society, by
looking at the material consequences of marital breakdown, became
of great use to family law reformers in the United States.120
Rodolfo Sacco contributed to Rheinstein’s and Llewellyn’s project
in an essay that extends the range of positive-sociology functional-
ism. Sacco’s work is fuelled by an anti-dogmatist tendency and is not
directed at harmonizing and purifying the law. Rather, Sacco’s com-
mitment to legal diversity, pluralism and the social sciences through
his idea of legal formants makes him a strong critic of harmonization
projects.121 To be sure, Sacco’s focus on family law is surprisingly lim-
ited and sporadic. However, in a collection of essays attacking the
ideological battleground of divorce in the late 1960s (still forbidden
by the Italian legislature), Sacco aimed to recast the debate on the
importance of marriage and divorce. He sought a secular, rather than
Catholic, perspective on the problem of divorce.122
In his Weberian comparison of the status of divorce legislation in
Western Europe and Russia, Sacco pointed out that the positions on
divorce need to be spread along two axes of comparison characterized
by “ideal types,” i.e., in Rheinstein’s words, “mental constructs meant
to serve as categories of thought the use of which will help us to catch
the infinite manifoldness of reality by comparing its phenomena with
those “pure” types . . . .”123 The first axis portrays those countries
that allow “consensual divorce” versus those that allow it only for
“proper cause” through the intervention of the State. The second axis
differentiates countries that treat divorce as a “remedy” from those
that treat it as a “penalty.”124 In reality, most of the examples Sacco
offered present hybrids between these categories through different
combinations of doctrinal solutions. For instance, Sacco observed that
in a minority of countries, the rule of indissolubility of marriage is
still in place. While more countries are legalizing divorce, they are
also introducing ways for the state to intervene in order to protect
third party interests, often those of children, which are harmed by
120. See also Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage
Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633 (1956).
121. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991); see also Rodolfo Sacco, Legal For-
mants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 343 (1991). The structural disjuncture that Sacco finds in legal rules is be-
tween their declaratory statements and their operative rules which present gaps that
recur throughout the various legal sources of each legal system. In refusing the princi-
ple of the unity of the law, Sacco insists that each legal rule becomes the product of
the interaction, competition, and struggle among the different legal formants (legisla-
tion, case-law, scholarly work, ideology in the Soviet legal system, etc.).
122. See L’ORA DEL DIVORZIO (E. Rovasenda et al. eds., 1969).
123. Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCI-
ETY xvii, xxx (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Max Rheinstein ed., 1967).
124. See Rodolfo Sacco, Il Divorzio Nelle Esperienze Estere, in L’ORA DEL DIVORZIO
197, 203 (E. Rovasenda et al. eds., 1969).
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the marital breakdown.125 Because of the variety of legal solutions to
protect third party interests, which allow the State to intervene in
the marriage breakdown, Sacco’s plea is to prevent the current Ital-
ian debate on divorce from being shaped by merely ideological and
religious views. Instead, in allowing divorce with some restrictions,
he stresses the need for a precise legal strategy addressing which
parties ought to be protected in each particular context.
The centrality of family law in the positive-sociology tradition à
la Llewellyn, Rheinstein, and Sacco certainly allowed for important
research and understanding of different family regimes through com-
parative law work.126 Their legacy, however, did not help to establish
the centrality of family law in the Western discipline of comparative
law, which was mainly driven by unification through legal, rather
than social science. Their legal realist turn was not destined to recon-
figure Western comparative law, and the idea of family law
exceptionalism continued to influence functionalist approaches.
III. REPRODUCING AND SUBVERTING THE MARKET/
FAMILY DICHOTOMY
Even though the choice between alternative functionalist meth-
odologies is not a recent development, it has acquired new
significance since the 1990s. Because of recent reconfigurations of the
market/family distinction, the family is at the center of comparative
law projects pursuing convergence and harmonization of Western le-
gal regimes.
Today, comparative legal inquiries in family law are widespread
but they are marked by a methodological contrast: proponents of har-
monization and convergence evoke some elements of social-purpose
functionalism by depicting family law as private, scientific, and non-
politicized in search of the “best” family law regime within Western
models. The diversity proponents addressing the plurality of family
regimes, by contrast, evoke some elements of positive-sociology func-
tionalism by adopting structural comparisons in which the family,
just like the market, is dependent on sociological patterns and cul-
tural norms which have different distributive implications depending
on the social context.
125. Id. at 218.
126. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
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A. Convergence and Reproduction of the Dichotomy
  With the rise of international human rights conventions addressing
the family and of governance feminism projects,127 lawyers are in-
creasingly addressing the convergence of family law regimes through
the language of universal and individual rights. Mary Ann Glendon’s
Introduction to the volume on Persons and Family in the Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Comparative Law offers an interesting
example of this convergence approach, softened by the acknowledg-
ment of the persistent diversity in family law regimes:
When modern comparative law took shape as a discipline in
the late 19th century, it was commonly thought that family
law was too much the product of each nation’s distinctive
culture and history to be a promising subject for comparison.
By the late 20th century, however, broad similarities had ap-
peared in the family law systems of the liberal democracies
of the WEST, and a comparative approach was routinely be-
ing employed by law reformers and scholars in most
countries . . . . These trends have not proceeded at the same
pace everywhere, and they have taken different forms in dif-
ferent places, but almost all the world’s legal systems have
now been affected by the advance of human rights ideas in
general, and women’s equality in particular.128
Some comparatists explain that family law convergence has hap-
pened in the last decades in a spontaneous way, without the need for
legislative intervention, but rather through shared legal ideals about
the family which are subsequently implemented in a more or less uni-
form manner among different Western industrialized states.129 As
Maria Rosaria Marella explains, convergence is often used as an ar-
gument to legitimize further unification of substantive laws, because
“European family-law systems—as the supporters of harmonisation
emphasise—are converging along three main paths or trends: liberty,
equality and secularity.”130
Two elements in this convergence thesis can be traced back to
social-purpose functionalism and the legacy of René David in compar-
ative law. First, in seeking spontaneous convergence, legal scholars
127. For a definition of governance feminism, see Janet Halley, Prabha Kotis-
waran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work and Sex Trafficking: Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. GENDER 335, 340
(2006) (describing governance feminism as “the incremental but by now quite noticea-
ble installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power”).
128. Glendon, supra note 5, at 6-7. R
129. See Schwenzer, supra note 14, at 148 (listing among the various converging R
tendencies in Western Europe the widespread acceptance of no fault divorce and co-
habitation regimes).
130. Marella, supra note 6, at 79. R
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present it as a purely legal matter, while they pay very little atten-
tion to the underlying conflicting ideologies or the divergence in
social practices that survive or are even heightened despite the in-
creasing legal convergence.131 An example of this doctrinal
convergence is Ingeborg Schewenzer’s explanation of the increase of
consensual divorce:
A fundamental change in values and conceptions beginning
in the 1970s has led to a gradual shift of focus from status to
the actual relationship regardless of status. In divorce law,
this development was first reflected in the abolition of the
concept of fault. Nowadays, consensual divorce is at the cen-
tre of legal practice. This trend is encouraged on a
procedural level through simplified procedures whereby
couples agree on divorce and on the inclusion of mediation as
an instrument to assist couples in reaching an agreement.
The law concerning the consequences of divorce is also char-
acterized by a general withdrawal of the state; again, the
primary focus is on the private autonomy of the parties.132
In this depoliticized image of reform, every cause of convergence is
not only inevitable but legal.
A second element of the convergence thesis that displays a logic
similar to David’s work in Africa is that legal convergence happens
only in the West and not in other legal families. In fact, the market/
family dichotomy is nested and reproduced in the “Rest” of the world
so that in Africa there is no spontaneous convergence of family law
regimes guided by modernization and enlightenment values. An ex-
ample of the reproduction of the market/family dichotomy beyond the
West emerges in Harry Krause’s work:
In the “West,” relatively recent and liberated answers to
many fundamental issues—ranging from individual free-
dom, to women’s equality, to homosexual rights, abortion,
even to the proper role of sexuality on television and
schools—are now perceived as necessary givens, sometimes
as natural, universal human rights. This is not so elsewhere.
Western notions, particularly of women’s equality, are seen
in many traditional cultures as the infidel’s attack on millen-
nia-old religious imperatives . . . . [T]he West’s current moral
certainties do not play well in the industrially “developing”
131. For a description of doctrinal convergence on consensual divorce, see IN-
GEBORG SCHWENZER, MARIEL DIMSEY (Collaborator) MODEL FAMILY CODE: FROM A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2006). On the increasing ideological divergences underlying
family law doctrinal convergence, see Nicola, supra note 31. R
132. Introduction to SCHWENZER, DIMSEY (Collaborator) id.
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world—as indeed they would not have played well in the
West a mere one hundred years ago.133
As Krause demonstrates, the study of spontaneous convergence
in family law is a geographically limited phenomenon based on
shared values influenced by Christian morality and Western liber-
alism. When the study of comparative family law comprises the Rest,
it entails very limited possibilities of comparison of marriage, divorce,
and reproductive laws with Western standards.134 This comparative
law pedagogy focuses mostly on the Western legal tradition, while
dismissing the Rest—so that when comparative lawyers deal with
these “other” traditions, they emphasize the need to codify commer-
cial codes or draft new constitutions with very little hope to change
local family law regimes.135
B. Harmonizing and Subverting the Dichotomy
After WWII, the predominant functionalist approach in compara-
tive law bore important resemblances to social-purpose
functionalism. It relied on a holistic perspective of law and society
and a commitment to harmonization. The important An Introduction
to Comparative Law by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz is character-
istic of this tradition. These German scholars committed to
universalizing legal problems by focusing on a strictly un-political
private and commercial law.136 In their work, the market/family di-
chotomy is relevant as their commitment to the harmonization of the
market leads to a focus on the law of obligations while setting aside
the family as public, political, and thus difficult to reform. Consider-
ing various hot topics in the family law area, they conclude: “So there
are areas in comparative law where judgment must be suspended,
where the student simply cannot say which solution is better.”137
Like social-purpose functionalists, Zweigert and Kötz are com-
mitted to objective and scientific legal knowledge aiming for “a truly
international comparative law which could form the basis for a uni-
versal legal science.”138 In addition, they are committed to
unification, as they seek to make international business easier
through comparative law.139
133. Krause, supra note 9, at 1110.
134. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 25.
135. See DAVID, supra note 107. R
136. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
137. Id. at 40.
138. Id. at 46.
139. See id. at 16 (stating that “[l]egislators all over the world have found that on
many matters good laws cannot be produced without the assistance of comparative
law . . . .”); see also id. at 17 (quoting Rudolf von Jhering, stating that “[t]he reception
of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and
need”).
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Indeed, a large number of comparative law projects since the
mid-1980s addressing the harmonization or the “Common Core” of
European private law have been committed to the classic and rigid
structure of private law finding common principles in the market,
whereas the harmonization of the family was not yet at stake.140 This
is because the context in which these Europeanization projects flour-
ished was presented as a neutral one, through which the EU would
harmonize the law of the market while lacking the formal compe-
tence to interfere with Member State’s cultural and political
traditions embedded in domestic family law regimes. This strategy
was successful because at the formal level the EU did not have the
competence to undertake the harmonization of family law, even
though since the late 1960s it became clear that the European Com-
munity had a huge influence on domestic family law regimes by
introducing gender equality in the workplace and regulating conflict-
of-laws rules about the recognition of foreign marriages and
divorces.141
This approach strengthened some of the private/public, market/
social, and federal/local dichotomies that have pervaded academic
and judicial debates on the harmonization of private law. Family law
has consistently found itself on the public, social, and local side of the
equation, thus leaving it to Member States, rather than the Commu-
nity institutions, to regulate.142
Since the late 1990s, however, a number of scholars have created
a Commission on European Family Law (CEFL), aiming at sub-
verting the market/family dichotomy while advancing a European-
wide project to harmonize the law of the family.143 Their project to
create common Principles of European Family Law144 resembles so-
cial-purpose functionalism in so far as they are committed to the
search of “best solutions” based on the social purpose of modernizing
the family. Like classic social-purpose functionalists, they collapse
140. See THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Mauro Bussani & Ugo
Mattei eds., 2003).
141. See Marella, supra note 6, at 83; see also Jürgen Basedow, La reconnaissance
des divorces étrangers: droit positif allemand et politique législative européenne, 67
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTL. PRIVÉ 461-82 (1978) (recognizing early on that the
European common market had relevance also for family law, through conflict of laws
in the early Rome and Brussels Conventions).
142. See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration:
The Case of Property, 10 EUR. L.J. 751, 762 (2004); see also Fernanda Nicola, Another
View on European Integration: Distributive Stakes in the Harmonization of European
Law, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOL-
OGY AND STRATEGY 233-60 (Clare Dalton ed., 2007); Transatlanticism: Constitutional
Asymmetry and Selective Reception of U.S. Law and Economics in the Formation of
European Private Law, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 87 (2008); Philomila
Tsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 873 (2010).
143. See Commission on European Family Law (CEFL), http://www.ceflonline.net/
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
144. See BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 15.
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the “is and ought” distinction.145 In proclaiming their neutrality in
method, their universal aspirations, and their commitment to pro-
gress and modernization, they are presenting comparative family law
as a field in which their methodological choices are unanimously ac-
cepted. In the words of Katharina Boele-Woelki: “Irrespective of how
we perceive comparative law—as a method or as an autonomous di-
rection in legal research—today it has become a reality; it has
acquired a firm standing and won universal application in all legal
sciences.”146
These scholars have subverted the market/family dichotomy be-
cause the family is no longer representative of an organic unity,
hierarchy, and local difference, but rather of private and universal
rights of each individual that can be harmonized through compara-
tive law just like the law of the market. Their project has sparked a
lively controversy between those in favor or against the harmoniza-
tion of European family law.147
CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE DICHOTOMY
Some of the elements of positive-sociology functionalism à la
Llewellyn, Rheinstein, Kahn-Freund, and Sacco have re-emerged in
the wake of scholars who envisage a critical direction for comparative
family law projects. These scholars resist the path towards a neces-
sary convergence of Western family law, and they have thus
demonstrated their skepticism vis à vis projects aimed at harmoniz-
ing European family law. Instead, they suggest that comparative
family law should neither strive for harmonization nor become an im-
possible task. It should, however, be approaced in a critical
fashion.148
Elements of positive-sociology functionalism appear in projects
committed to showing how the family, together with the market,
played an important role in the globalization of legal thought.149 In
light of the legal realist legacy, these comparative lawyers are com-
mitted to a clear separation of the “is from the ought.” This leads
them to favor legal pluralism based on the conviction that legal
change happens not because of a single social purpose, but rather
through a multiplicity of local and global factors, both internal and
145. See Antokolskaia, supra note 14, at 165.
146. Katharina Boele-Woelki, What Comparative Family Law Should Entail, 4
UTRECHT L. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
147. See PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW
IN EUROPE, supra note 14.
148. See Marella, supra note 6; see also David Bradley, A Family Law for Europe? R
Sovereignty, Political Economy and Legitimation, in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICA-
TION AND HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 65; Tsoukala,
supra note 142.
149. See Kennedy, supra note 46.
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external to family law. Finally, in contrast to social-purpose function-
alism, these comparative lawyers highlight the cultural specificity of
each family law regime situated in the reality of an increasingly
global political economy.150
To make sense of the market/family dichotomy, rather than over-
coming, subverting or reproducing it, scholarly projects should show
the interdependence between the law of the family and the market.
In contrast to family law initiatives committed to the harmonization
and to the ones launched by the World Bank on development with the
purpose of modernizing family law according to Western standards,
the comparative lawyer is first asked to contextualise and under-
stand the many conflicting functions of legal rules before suggesting
a specific reform strategy. In this vein, scholars have highlighted that
family law reforms should not be about only moral values and univer-
sal rights but, just like reforms of the market, about their economic
and distributive consequences as well.
150. See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family
Law: A Report from the Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism Conference, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 753 (2010).
